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RURAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN A
SEMIARID AFRICAN COUNTRY
THE CASE OF BOTSWANA

LOUISE FORTMANN

commercial agriculture has evolved; transportation and communication infrastructures
have been radically improved; and urban
centers and nonagricultural industry have
been established. Furthermore, the advent of
new technologies has in some ways and some
places altered the effects of semiaridity and of
drought. Hand-dug wells, dams, diesel engines,
and water tankers have allowed the periodic
substitution of labor and capital for rainfall.
The cumulative impact of such technological
innovation has been to change the social
meaning of climate for many Batswana. 3
Yet, in the midst of this monumental
change, some aspects of rural social organization in Botswana have been remarkably stable.
This article explores the proposition that their
stability is partly due to the persistence of the
need for household flexibility, regardless of
this change and pressure for change. The
intent is to remind readers of the kernel of
truth in the theory of environmental determinism: climate is one important independent
variable influencing social organization.
Four forms of social organization-the
social organization of land tenure, water use,
multiple residences, and village-level organization-are examined. The context in which

Environmental determinism has long been
discredited in explaining the social organization of pastoral and agro-pastoral peoples. I
Today the effect of climate on social organization is recognized as mediated by social,
economic, and political factors. 2 Thus, social
organization in Botswana reflects the influence
of a wide variety of factors, among them
Christian missionaries, interethnic warfare,
past and continuing aggression of South
Africa, introduction of the iron plow, British
colonialism, Boer traders, discovery of minerals (most recently diamonds), international
donor aid, and so on. Over the past century
there have been substantial changes in a
number of important trends: life expectancy,
literacy, and per capita income have increased;
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they function is described in the following
discussions of the Botswana setting and of the
need for flexibility in semiarid climates. 4
THE BOTSWANA CONTEXT

Slightly larger than France, landlocked
Botswana, with its population of 935,000, is
located astride the Tropic of Capricorn,
bounded by Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and
the Republic of South Africa. Although the
Okavango Delta in the north contains water
year-round, most rivers and streams contain
water only seasonally (see fig. 1). Most of the
country is savanna with, in the north, large
areas of mophane trees (Colophospermum mopane), which provide fodder for cattle and act
as a host for an edible caterpillar. Botswana
was a British protectorate from 1885 to 1966. It
became independent under the presidency of
Sir Seretse Khama in 1966 and has remained a
multiparty democracy. Its major export earnings come from the sale of diamonds and
cattle.
Early travelers referred to Botswana's Kgalagadi Desert as the Great Thirstland, a rather
vivid portrayal of its arid and semiarid qualities. Nationally, mean annual rainfall is
approximately 500 mm (20 inches), while
actual rainfall varies from roughly 200 to 1000
mm (8 to 40 inches) depending on the year and
the place. ' Tyson (who predicted the present
drought) found an approximately twenty-year
oscillation in rainfall: ten wet years are followed by ten dry ones with a few dry years
interspersed among the wet ones and vice
versa. An arable drought (in which crops but
not livestock are lost) can be expected every
four to five years. Rainfall itself is unreliable
with extreme annual variations, tends to occur
in heavy showers of short duration, and is
highly unpredictable in anyone place or at
anyone time. The average Motswana thus is
faced with a difficult climate that is further
complicated by wholly unpredictable rainfall.
Most of the population lives in the rural
areas, the vast majority being settled within
100 kilometers of the railway line running

north-south in the eastern part of the country.
The rural household production system is
adapted to the semiarid climate through two
types of land use-crop production and livestock production. Most rural Batswana live
near reliable water in a village during the dry
season and move out to a residence in the
farming areas (hereafter referred to as the
lands) as soon as the first rains fall and surface
water can be trapped. The typical rural
household in eastern Botswana farms two
hectares of land (often located in scattered
parcels in order to maximize the chance of
some plots receiving rainfall) with an o~- or
donkey-drawn plow. Generally sorghum (or,
in better watered areas, maize), is the main
crop, supplemented with watermelon and
perhaps sunflowers or beans. A few chickens
or small stock may be kept around the
compound. Roughly 45 percent of the rural
households hold cattle for plowing, milk, and
savings. Wealthier households with larger
herds may keep their animals at a third
residence (often little more than a camp),
called the cattlepost. Smaller herds and draft
animals are typically kept at the lands. Needs
for cash (to buy food, for instance) are often
met by remittances from a household member
who has obtained wage employment in the
urban areas of Botswana or in South Africa as
a miner or domestic servant. Cash may also be
generated by selling livestock, crops, or fuelwood; by local casual employment; and by
women's small enterprises, such as beer brewing, basket weaving, handicrafts, and snack
food sales.
FLEXIBILITY IN THE FACE OF
RESOURCE SCARCITY

The most important factor for survival in a
nonindustrial society in a semiarid climate is
flexibility, that is, access to multiple means of
obtaining resources. Historically, the household in Botswana had to be able to move to
avoid or reduce hardship. There could not be
total reliance on one place, one resource, or
one mode of production. If a household or

192 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 1986

Roads
-

Railways
District boundaries
National parks

~ Rivers

o

100
200
300 Icm
b'======~'======~'========'

ZAMBIA
ANGOLA
/

-

,

./

ZIMBABWE

NAMIBIA

I

.-'

'.

I

Gemsbok
"\ Nar P.rk

\
.)

t-.

,... I

.J

Tshabong

...,._.- . ./../

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

.

FIG. 1. Republic of Botswana. Source: Charles Harvey, Ed. Papers on the Economy of Botswana.
London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981. Frontispiece.
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village could not move when the times of
climatic stress inevitably came, it would exhaust the resources around it. In the past,
flexibility was achieved by moving to where
the resources were. Today this flexibility can in
part be obtained by bringing the resources to
the village or the household (for example
through relief in the form of food and/or
employment or through the provision of water
during drought) or by shifting dependence to a
new resource such as urban wage employment.
Whatever its specific form, flexibility remains a
crucial strategy for survival in semiarid areas.
For some Batswana part of this strategy for
survival consists of limiting pressure on natural
resources in order to increase the chance that
there will always be a resource to fall back on.
This is most readily accomplished by limiting
access to the resource. Thus, in some cases,
certain areas of rangeland are not used in the
wet season in order to insure that they are
available for use in the dry season. Similarly,
certain water sources are reserved for dry
season use in order to preserve a continuous
supply of water throughout the year. Obviously, restricting use in order to preserve options
in the time of stress necessarily limits options
at any given time. This becomes complicated
when more than one social unit lays claim to
the same resource or set of resources. In such
cases one group's management strategy may
limit another group's flexibility. Or one group
may try to preserve its own resource by using
that of another group. Such cases are inevitably fraught with conflict. As we shall see, the
ability to limit access to one's own resource is
restricted by the need to maintain reciprocal
relations with others in order to have access to
local resources in time of need.
Despite shifts in power among pre- and
post-Independence elites, rural social organization in Botswana has maintained a balance
between achieving flexibility and limiting
pressure on resources. For example, the local
ability to reduce pressure on a resource
through exclusion increasingly may be limited
by the locus of decision making at national
even international (in the form of donor

agencies) levels. Thus, flexibility has in some
cases assumed even more importance recently
that it has in the past.
In summary, the most crucial factor in the
adaptation of social structure to the climate is
the maintenance of flexibility. Thus, changes
in the social structure which reduce flexibility
or allow flexibility to be maintained only at the
expense of general equity are unlikely to be
adopted. 6 Conversely, those changes that do
not interfere with general flexibility have a
great likelihood of being adopted.
LAND TENURE

"Land is a very special resource, the very
base on which the nation stands. The way
in which it is administered is a profound
expression of national values."-Presidential Commission on Land T enure 7
This section explores the theoretical tradeoffs between communal and private land
ownership and the pressures to privatize land
tenure in Botswana and discusses available
data on the effects of private and communal
property systems on environmental degradation in Botswana. Since flexibility is essential
to survival and implies the ability to move,
land cannot be held in a communal or private
form that ties people to a fixed place. The
strategies for obtaining flexibility adopted
under conditions of private and communal
land ownership can, in theory, be expected to
differ. In the abstract, the private owner has at
least three options for obtaining flexibility.
One is to accumulate enough contiguous land
to include fallback areas for all or major
contingencies. In most semiarid regions this
involves such large areas of land as to dispossess others and to have severe effects on social
equity. A second option is to acquire scattered
parcels of land that include the necessary
fallbacks. Such a plan is functional only if one
and one's herds have both the right of transit
across the land of others and access to the
resources (water and grazing) that allow transit
to take place. A third possibility is to make
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arrangements to use the resources of neighbors
when necessary.
In contrast, under communal ownership
the entire resource base is, in theory, available
for use by all members of the social group,
leaving everyone free to go to the resources.
Traditional property rights provided flexibility
for the whole community in Botswana. 8 The
chief, as head of the tribe, controlled all the
land in his (or her, in the case of female
regents) domain, assigning areas for residence
and for farming to each ward in the capital. In
turn, this land was assigned to individual
households by ward heads. Households had
private rights (which could be inherited,
loaned, or given away but not sold) to
residential and arable land and wells and
dams. If land were abandoned, it reverted to
the tribe and could be assigned to someone else
by the chief or the ward head. Surface water,
grazing, wild edible plants, clay, and other
natural products were used in common, as was
the crop residue left after harvest.
Much of the traditional system of land
tenure has been retained to the present day
despite the numerous pressures toward change
beginning with British and Boer imperialism,
which entailed a variety of requests and
demands for freehold title to land. 9 A second
pressure for change (continued by some postIndependence donors) came from the officials
of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, who felt
that communal land tenure was incompatible
with proper range management. 1O A third set
of pressures is associated with the demand for
secure collateral for bank loans. Many people
believe that they cannot obtain a loan unless
they obtain freehold title to their land.
The fourth set of pressures is associated
with the monetarization of the Botswana
economy and the commercialization and increasing profitability of the livestock sector in
particular. The terms of trade have historically
favored livestock over arable agriculture, a
relationship that has been reinforced by an
EEC program for the cattle industry under
which Botswana producers have received
above world market price for their cattle.1i As

a result, some of the cattle-owning elite have
tried various means of bringing grazing land
under their exclusive control. The 1975 Tribal
Grazing Lands Policy (TGLP), which established long-term leases for private ranches, has
been characterized by some observers as a land
grab by the rich. Some entrepreneurs have also
attempted both legally and illegally to control
communal grazing areas for their own private
use by various means, including the establishment of private water rights. This has sometimes led to dramatic confrontations with
communities whose land is being expropriated. I '
The strength of the traditional land tenure
system against these pressures was demonstrated in the recommendation of the 1983
Presidential Commission on Land Tenure that
there be no "tenure changes in respect of
arable and grazing land." The Commission
noted that customary land tenure systems
"already possess the important features of
security of tenure, easy access to land and
inheritability which can in fact encourage
development. The people did not express any
need for radical changes because they felt there
is nothing wrong with the existing system."ll
The Commission concluded that "Tenure
change which could produce landlessness
before other economic opportunities are generally available would clearly be ill-advised."14
The staying power of the traditional land
tenure system lies in its adaptation to the
vagaries of the climate, its compatibility with
other social institutions both modern and
traditional, and the drawbacks of the muchtouted alternative of privatization. For example, ]. Bruce has demonstrated that the
traditional tenure system is compatible with
the requirements of modern commercial lending institutions. I5 Financial institutions themselves testified before the Presidential Land
Tenure Commission that "restrictions on the
hypothecation of tribal land are not their main
constraint on lending. "16 Thus the argument
that capital-dependent development cannot
take place in the absence of freehold title is not
persuasive.

RURAL ORGANIZATION IN BOTSWANA 195

Traditional rural social relations based on
reciprocity and interdependence, which provide households with flexibility, also support
the maintenance of the traditional tenure
system. P. Peters has observed that
All but a tiny minority are engaged in
complex networks of ties, often based on
cattle exchanges, with a range of other
... families. It is through such ties that
they acquire labor for herding and for crop
production, services, political support, favors, help and so forth. Such dense networks of dependence and interdependence
represent social relations of production that
effectively inhibit, for now, the thrust
toward ... exclusionary ranching practices. "17
Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons
argument holds that communal land tenure
leads inevitably to environmental degradation. 1S But privatization in Botswana has been
associated with environmental degradation
and has, in some cases, been the cause of
degradation resulting from land shortages
created by the alienation of communally held
land. For example, the worst environmental
degradation (both overgrazing and sheet and
gully erosion) in Botswana is generally considered to be in Northeast District where the
Ndebele chief Lobengula granted a concession
over all minerals in a 6000 square kilometer
(2316 square mile) area to a European mining
company. The terms of the concession continued to be broadened until the T ati Company
obtained freehold ownership of the land in
1911.19 The result of the concession was the
crowding of the former inhabitants of the land
and their livestock onto 344 square miles of
"Native Reserves." This area, only 15 percent
of their former holdings, was grossly inadequate for the size of the population and, as a
result, the environment rapidly deteriorated. 20
Privatization in this case created conditions of
land scarcity under which no land tenure
system could have prevented degradation.
The implicit argument of those who press
for privatization is that management techniques can be substituted for flexibility. But

privatization does not necessarily create the
conditions of good management. Many private
farms are themselves not well managed and are
the sites of considerable erosion. 21 Some ranches established on the principle that private
land is best have had adverse ecological and
social effects. 22 The establishment of private
ranches has not succeeded in stopping overgrazing because of the amount of the investment required for good management on these
relatively small pieces of land and the lack of
government enforcement of either good management or stocking limits.21 Further, in a
perversion of the use of communal land as a
means to flexibility, private ranch owners may
graze their animals on communal lands in
order to reduce the pressure on their private
holding.24
To be sure, there is degradation associated
with communal land tenure in Botswana. But
even here, available data suggest comparatively less overgrazing in some communal areas.
The point is that privatization has not proven
to be uniformly effective in controlling overgrazing. And, even given existing levels of
overgrazing on communal land, the specter of
dispossession that privatization raises has
made it the less desirable of the two options for
many Batswana.
CUSTOMARY WATER LAW AND
WATER USE PATTERNS

Water is the sine qua non of survival in a
semiarid climate. Because it is crucial in
providing access to other resources (in this case
grazing and arable land), the rules governing
access to and use of water will affect other
institutional arrangements.
Customary water law in Botswana is similar to that of other arid and semiarid regions. 25
Typically, naturally flowing water and naturally occurring surface water are common property resources. Travelers and their herds and
those who need water for domestic uses
generally have the right, upon seeking permission, to use any water source. These rights may
be attached to obligations to assist in the
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maintenance of the water point. Such rules are
consistent with the adaptive principle of
maximizing flexibility, ensuring that a household will have access to water should it be
forced to move.
The investment of either labor or capital in
the development of a water point creates
private rights to its use. (Sometimes the point
is made in customary law that it is the
structure and not the water which is privately
held.)16 Thus, dams, haffirs, wells, and boreholes can only be used with the permission of
the owner, although she or he is subject to the
norm about providing water for travelers and
domestic use. This regulation of water use is
important because it can limit pressure on
grazing. Unless there is open-access water
nearby, the range in the vicinity of a private
water point will be grazed only by the cattle of
the owner and of those who have permission
to use the water point. This rule is further
enforced by the common understanding that
the owner of a borehole has priority over
grazing within an eight kilometer radius
around it. Indeed, it is increasingly felt that the
surrounding land is allocated along with the
right to drill the borehole. This understanding
has furthered the development of water points
as a means of controlling land.
Because private rights to water sources
create de facto private rights over the surrounding land, we can judge the relative effects
of private and communal land tenure by
comparing the grazing around private and
communal water points. L. Fortmann and E.
Roe measured range conditions at four points
along grazing transects around 21 group- or
government-owned (both of which were in
these cases de facto communally owned) water
points and 22 privately owned water points in
the eastern communal areas.27 While the areas
around both sets of water points were in poor
overall range condition, the range around the
communal water points was measured as being
significantly better than that around the
private water points. That is, de facto private
control of the land did not appear to have the
beneficial environmental effects claimed for it.

Indeed, quite the contrary was true.
These results are not explained by the type
of water point associated with private and
communal ownership. There were no significant differences in the state of the range
around different types of water points (wells,
boreholes, dams, etc.)28 Rather, the explanation would seem to lie in the flexibility of the
customary pattern of water use that involves
moving to where the water (and other resources) are. Communal water points in rural
Botswana are used in a fallback system. Each
year as the rains start, households move out to
the lands areas where seasonal water sources
are filled by the rains and then fall back to
more reliable groundwater sources and eventually back to the village as the seasonal
sources go dry. This system creates rotational
grazing that relieves pressure on the range.
Private sources, in contrast, tend to be used
year-round and the grazing thus gets no relief.
The danger of being locked by private property
into an inflexible pattern of resource use that is
inappropriate for the climate is apparent in
this example.
Flexibility is furthered by customary water
law, which preserves certain sources as common property and establishes the right of
certain categories of users to water even from
private water sources. The traditional use
pattern utilizes resources as they are available
and preserves certain sources for times of
stress. Thus, both customary water law and
the traditional system of water use can be seen
as adaptations to the semiarid climate.
Nonetheless, the possibility of substituting
capital for rainfall has led to changes in the
pattern of water use. New water sources
provided by the government, particularly the
boreholes, have reduced the necessity of
moving to find water. Moreover, since it is
possible to transport large quantities of water,
people do not necessarily have to move now
even in drought or when the boreholes go dry.
Yet the effect of this technology is limited
because it can overcome the effects of weather
but not necessarily those of climate, and it
introduces a new kind of uncertainty in the
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form of mechanical failure. Even the deepest
borehole may go dry or suffer an engine
breakdown. 29 Therefore, many private water
point owners still must maintain reciprocity
with their neighbors in the event they may
need to use other private or communal water
points in the future. It is this need for
reciprocity (which might also be viewed as the
need for the substitution of social organization
for rainfall) that is probably the major force for
equity in the system.
MULTIPLE RESIDENCES AND
SHIITING SETTLEMENTS

Various Tswana peoples have lived in the
area now known as Botswana for many
centuries. For much of this time they have
lived in large settlements reported by astonished European travelers as early as 1804. 10 For
example, in 1906 the village of Serowe had an
estimated population of 22,000. However, as
noted above, farming was done at separate,
smaller, seasonal settlements. This pattern of
multiple settlements was dictated by climate
and soils. The Agricultural and Economic
advisor to the 1933 Pim Commission commented:
The climate being a dry one, land suitable
for cultivation is not always easy to findthe best is undoubtedly in the lower lying
places. The present tribal organization
which consists of the consolidation of the
population into large villages ... has enabled the tribes to select the best situated
areas for tillage purposes. Scattered cultivation with the individual owner living on the
soil with his arable holdings and grazing
immediately around him would be unsuitable for the greater part of the Native
Reserves, owing to this difficulty of obtaining arable land suitably situated for each
holding. It would increase denudation and
might eventually turn the country into a
wilderness. The consolidation of holdings
has, on the other hand, permitted a real
choice of sites for crop-raising and it's quite

a noticeable feature in the Reserves that the
best lands have been selected for this
purpose. ll
The pattern of multiple residences has been
in a process of change for many years. At one
time it seems that nearly the entire population
moved to the lands during the farming season,
returning to the village after harvest. But by
1943 1. Schapera was reporting Chief Bathoen's negative views of those who at that
time were remaining year-round at the lands.12
In more recent times additional households
have taken up permanent residence at the
lands. For example, some 22 percent of the
respondents in a large-scale 1980 survey said
they lived there permanently."
This change can be explained only in part
by the water technology that can make water
available year-round at the lands. For even in
lands areas served by boreholes and with such
social amenities as schools and health posts,
some households continue to come and go
with the seasons. In other lands areas with
extremely inconvenient dry season water
sources yet other households soldier on at a
permanent lands residence.
Admittedly, there has been more change in
this form of social organization than in land
tenure or the system of water rights and use.
But this change must be judged in the light of
three factors. First, three out of four households still move every year. Under the system
of multiple residences, the village was the locus
of civic and ceremonial activities. This role,
which the village retains to the present day,
tends to draw people back into the villages.
Second, choice of residence can be distinguished from systems of property rights in that
it has become an individual, not a societal,
decision. A family's decision to maintain a
single residence at the lands does not interfere
with the flexibility of other households as
would a change in the land tenure or water
rights systems. Third, it is a rescindable
decision. Should water technology prove to be
unreliable or excessively expensive, permanent
lands residents may once again establish a
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village residence. Thus, a household's relinquishing flexibility of residence is not itself an
inflexible act; flexibility can be resumed at any
time.
VILLAGE LEVEL
VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

From the arrival of the first European,
there has been a proliferation of western social
organizations, starting with the church. Now
nearly every village in Botswana is awash with
Parent Teacher Associations, Village Development Committees, Village Health Committees, Social Welfare Committees, Burial
Societies, Farmers Committees, dam groups,
small stock groups, dosing groups, carvers'
groups, basket making groups, the Red Cross,
Youth Associations, and several kinds of
women's clubs. Some of these are defunct or
moribund; others are small, weak, and of
limited duration. Indeed, some existed in the
first place only because villagers were too polite
to tell their initiators to go away. The groups
that survive are interesting because they have
been adapted to local conditions, often in ways
which lead those familiar with their western
prototype to conclude that they, too, are
defunct.
In contrast to exclusionary western organizational forms, traditional local organization
in Botswana has often been calculatedly reciprocal. J4 Further, traditional organizations have
not necessarily followed the western pattern of
year-round formal meetings. Among the myriad village-level nontraditional organizations,
perhaps the most illustrative of the complexities of their organizational adaptation are the
dam groupS.35 These were initiated by the
government as a part of its program of
providing dams for livestock watering at the
lands. Each group was to be given exclusive
rights to use the dam in return for their
agreement to maintain the dam and restrict its
use to 400 head.
The expatriate originators of the dam
group project were accustomed to sedentary
communities with a reasonably fixed population and private rights to land and water. The

communities in which the dam groups were to
be established were seasonal ones with communal rights to land and many water sources
and, in certain cases, de facto rights to use
even private water sources based on reciprocal
networks of rights and obligations.
Not surprisingly, the dam groups did not
function in the way their originators anticipated. First, they did not function regularly or
year-round. Rather, they were seasonal, not
just because residence in the communities was
seasonal but because the need for their functioning was restricted to the limited period of
the year after ephemeral surface water sources
have gone dry and before most people have left
the lands area for the village. Nor did these
groups have expressive functions. Social action
in Botswana is generally located in kin,
residential, neighborly, and patronage
relationships, not in clubs or similar organizations. Hence, when the dam groups had no
instrumental function to perform, they were
allowed to lapse. When it came time for fences
to be repaired and dam regulations to be
enforced, the dam groups became active. To
those accustomed to regular, solemn, and
formal meetings this perfectly rational seasonal
strategy appeared to be the sign of a defunct
organization.
Although dam groups provide a particularly clear example, various forms of seasonal
adaptation are typical of village-level organizations in Botswana. 16 Thus, we find flexible,
seasonal social structures based on reciprocity
and adapted to the difficulties of living in this
semiarid climate overwhelming the demands of
more rigid alien organizational forms.
CONCLUSIONS

Social structures in Botswana have historically been adapted to the vagaries and stresses
of the semiarid climate, as can be seen in the
land tenure system, the system of customary
water use and law, the system of multiple
residences, and the seasonal nature of many
village-level organizations. These social structures have shown remarkable staying power in
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the face of heavy pressures for economic and
political change since Independence. This is
particularly true of the systems of land tenure
and water rights that have persisted in spite of
national policy changes that, if successfully
implemented, would have affected rural households' flexibility and undermined the societal
value of equity. Note that this sort of flexibility
is necessary only for agricultural and livestock
production systems. Were the economic system to swing to, say, total dependence on
diamond revenues, much of the rationale for
the land and water rights systems would
collapse.
Although changes have occurred in the
substitution of permanent residence at the
lands for the system of multiple residences,
these changes have taken the form of individual decisions that do not affect the flexibility of
others and that affect equity only insofar as
those who live permanently at the lands are
able to farm more productively.
Finally, let us return to the conventional
wisdom that, while climate does affect social
organization in a semiarid environment, its
effect is mediated by a variety of social,
political, and economic structures. It has been
argued here that equal consideration should be
given to the fact that a variety of political and
economic changes may only slightly alter
social structure if a need for flexibility in a
semiarid environment persists. We have seen
that maintaining flexibility is the keystone of
adaptation in Botswana and that major shifts
in the social structure which weaken flexibility
are unlikely to occur unless the economic base
changes. Nor are changes that maintain flexibility but that significantly undermine basic
societal equity likely to occur. In sum, adaptation to a particularly difficult climate would
seem in part to explain the stability of particular organizational forms in Botswana.
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